If either property rights or institutions are weak, agents who create wealth by cooperating will later have an incentive to …ght over the distribution of it. In this paper we investigate theoretically and experimentally the circumstances under which welfare losses from investment in distributional contests destroy welfare gains from voluntary cooperation. We …nd that in situations, where the return to cooperation is high, subjects cooperate strongly and welfare exceeds the predicted non-cooperation levels. If returns to cooperation are low, then subjects still cooperate, but the resources wasted in the distributional con ‡ict lead to lower welfare than if subjects had followed the theoretical prediction of not cooperating.
Introduction
Whenever the cooperation of individuals generates surpluses for which no well de…ned property rights exist, a distributive con ‡ict might arise. If rational actors foresee that the distributive con ‡ict could become very severe they might refrain from cooperating in the …rst place. This creates a holdup problem. However, one can also imagine that actors do not foresee the damaging nature of distributive con ‡ict over the surplus created by cooperation, such that they end up worse o¤ than if they had not cooperated at all. Some historical examples like the Balkan con ‡ict, the Aceh wars or the Sri Lankan civil war come to mind. Initial cooperation and the following con ‡ict or civil war left these regions much worse o¤. 1 The same phenomenon is observed in the small. After a bitter divorce battle the parties are often worse o¤ than before they entered a marriage. The same is true for many joint ventures in the business world that have gone sour. This is even more often the case in criminal joint ventures, where property rights are not enforceable at all. Distributive con ‡icts over the proceeds from criminal activity often lead to considerable collateral damage. 2 Clearly, in real world situations (in particularly in large scale con ‡icts) many more factors than cooperation and distributive con ‡ict play a role.
The contribution of this paper is a clean investigation of the impact of cooperation and consecutive …ghting for its proceeds on welfare. Compared to other studies our main methodological advance is that we are shutting down other mechanisms that could have an impact on welfare. In order to achieve this, we develop a simple model capturing the essence of the problem. The empirical evaluation is made possible by taking the model to the laboratory. Our study is in the spirit of other recent papers that use laboratory experiments with contests in order to study con ‡ict situations (like Sheremeta, 2013, 2014; .
Our simple model has two stages. In stage one two players invest simultaneously into a group project, where the resulting value of the project is a multiple of the total investment. In stage two, after observing the total value of the group project, players simultaneously exert costly e¤ort with 1 See Hirshleifer (2001) , Grossman (1991 Grossman ( , 1999 , Grossman and Kim (1995) and Collier and Hoe-er (2004) for theories on the impact of material objectives on violent con ‡icts and civil wars. See also the econometric study and the case studies in Sambanis and Collier (2005a,b) for a comprehensive investigation of "greed versus grievance" as causes of civil wars, which shows that material objectives are important.
2 For a beautiful dramatic illustration of this mechanism at work, watch the movie "The Treasure of the Sierra Madre"with Humphrey Bogard, which was suggested to me by Phil Grossman. the aim to secure a share of the created value. The share a player receives is equal to her share of total e¤orts exerted.
First, we analyse a situation, where initial investment does not restrict the amount of e¤ort available in the distributional contest. This is the case if, e.g., investment and e¤ort are not taken from the same budget. One can think of situations, where e¤orts are physical and investments are …nancial or vice versa. Examples are illegal joint ventures such as drug syndicates with violent distributional battles or group production with court battles over the distribution of the returns. Cooperative investments does also not reduce the budget available for …ghting in cases where both investments and e¤orts are …nancial but the maximum investment is small compared to the total budget. Take multinationals investing in a joint venture for example. There the maximum amount reasonably invested in a joint venture is often small compared to the total assets of a …rm. Then investing an extra Dollar into the joint venture will not signi…cantly reduce the resources available for a potential court battle over the proceeds.
Our analysis shows that up to very high social returns for contributions a rational player would not cooperate (i.e. invest in the group project). We know from many experimental studies that subjects often cooperate in social dilemmas, though. It is interesting to explore the consequences for subjects that cooperate in the investment stage. For low social returns cooperation is actually welfare damaging when followed by optimal e¤orts, since the resources burned in the contest are greater than the surplus created from cooperating. Cooperation in the investment stage is only welfare enhancing if followed by e¤orts well below the equilibrium level. For higher social returns cooperation followed by equilibrium e¤orts is welfare increasing but still not individually rational.
The insight that the inability to commit to not …ghting in the future is a major cause of a severe hold-up problem motivates a variant of our model with constrained …ghting e¤orts. Here the players have to …nance their investment and their …ghting e¤ort from the same limited pool of resources. This is not only of theoretical interest but also describes many real world situations. For example, in contrast to multinationals, venture capitalists often only raise a certain amount of capital they can use in a joint venture. The investment into the joint venture and also potential fees for lawyers in subsequent distributive con ‡icts have to be paid out of it. Sports is another area where both investments into the joint project and e¤orts to secure the largest share of the proceeds come from the same pool of resources. Players have to invest from their pool of physical stamina into the team success as well as into their own fame, which in ‡uences the share of the team surplus they receive through salaries, etc. A more speci…c example are break-aways in cycling. Riders in a breakaway have to use their legs when cooperating with the aim to stay away from the peleton. However, they will lack the power expended, when the …nal sprint comes along, which decides who wins and who gets how much of the prize money.
While the same zero-contribution equilibrium as in the unconstrained case exists for the same range of social returns, the resource constraint also allows for other more e¢ cient equilibria. The intuition is the following: if both players invest a relatively high level of their resources into the joint project then they cannot …ght very hard anymore as they do not have much resources left. This might make investing worthwhile. Investing the full endowment is not an equilibrium though, as then the opponent could invest a little less and steal the whole surplus with a little bit of e¤ort.
With these theoretical predictions in hand we implement a two-by-two experimental design in the laboratory. We vary the marginal social return to investment (low vs. high). On the other dimension we vary if the e¤orts in the con ‡ict stage have to come out of the same endowment as the …rst-stage investment (constrained vs. unconstrained).
We …nd in contrast to much of the contest literature that subjects'average e¤orts are remarkably close to equilibrium. As subjects -this time contrary to equilibrium predictions -also contribute, we observe welfare damaging play in the low return treatments. Subjects learn with repetition and reduce their contributions such that the welfare losses become small in the …nal stages of the experiment. For high social returns without constraints on e¤ort, subjects overcome the social dilemma and social welfare is about 50 percent above the prediction. In the constrained case subjects also make positive contributions. These are lower than in the unconstrained case, as subjects are careful not to become defenseless in the distributive con ‡ict. The lower resulting e¤orts cannot fully compensate for the lower surplus generated and so contrary to the theoretical prediction welfare is lower than in the unconstrained case. The constraints, on the one hand, are useful to limit welfare reducing cooperation when the social return to cooperation is low. On the other hand, constraints are hindering subjects to fully realize welfare gains from cooperation when the returns are high.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section lays out the underlying model and derives equilibrium predictions. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 reports and discusses our results. We end with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
The model
In what follows we lay out our model. We combine a simple version of a cooperation game (a linear two-player voluntary contribution mechanism) with the simplest version of a distributional contest (a two-player Tullock contest, Tullock 1980) . In a …rst stage, players voluntarily invest in a group project. Then in a second stage, after observing the value of the group project, players simultaneously exert costly e¤ort in a distributive contest. The share of value from the group project a player receives is proportional to the ratio of her own e¤ort to the total e¤ort exerted.
Implicitly, our setup assumes that players cannot commit to parting amicably without …ghting. Also binding contracts specifying amicable splits are not possible. Hence, our model captures situations, where there exists an inherent temptation to …ght for a larger part of the pie. This does not mean that a …fty-…fty split without …ghting is impossible in our model, since both parties not exerting any e¤ort would accomplish this. 3 We denote player i 0 s investment in the group project as c i and her e¤ort exerted in the contest as e i . Further we denote a player's endowment as C, the value of the group project as V (c i ; c j ) and the value share accruing to i as i (e i ; e j ). Given this notation we can write the pro…t of player i as: 4 U i (c i ; c j ; e i ; e j ) := C + i (e i ; e j )V (c i ; c j ) c i e i (1)
For simplicity we use a standard Tullock contest function:
The value of the group project depends linearly on the investments and on the marginal social return to investment, MSRI, which we denote by :
We opted for a linear VCM for two reasons. Firstly, the wide use of linear VCMs in the literature allows a direct comparison of results. Secondly, and more importantly, a linear VCM is much easier to understand for experimental subjects than a non-linear version. Since we already have a stage with non-linear pro…ts in the Tullock contest, keeping the cooperation stage as simple as possible is a sensible way to ensure that subjects understand the payo¤ structure.
With respect to the e¤ort in the distributional contest di¤erent scenarios are imaginable. The e¤ort could be either taken from the same resources as the investment (e.g. wealth invested in a joint venture and expenditure for lawyers in the …ght for the proceeds) or from a di¤erent source (e.g. investment could be monetary and investment could be physical or time, etc.). We will consider both cases.
De…nition 1 In what follows we will look at two scenarios with regard to the strategy space for e¤ ort. a) We speak of the unconstrained case if the admissible action spaces are
It is easy to see that social e¢ ciency requires zero e¤orts, since e¤orts are costly and only decide over distribution. Adding the payo¤ of both players gives
(2) which also shows that full investment is socially e¢ cient as long as > 1: This is true independently of the existence of absence of constraints on the e¤orts.
Proposition 1 The social e¢ cient contributions for both cases and e¤ orts are 8i 2 f1; 2g; i 6 = j e S i = 0
2.1 Equilibrium in the unconstrained case
We use Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium as the solution concept. Any possible pair of initial investments induces a separate subgame. For given initial investments the best response for player i in stage two is determined by the …rst-order condition @ @e i U i (V; e i ; e j ) = e j (e i + e j ) 2 V 1 = 0:
Observe that player j 0 s …rst-order condition is symmetric. Solving yields:
Now move to the …rst stage. The expected payo¤ of player i; who anticipates equilibrium play in the second stage, becomes: 5
It is easy to see that player i chooses to contribute her full endowment C if > 4, while she does not contribute anything if < 4: We get the following subgame-perfect equilibrium for the unconstrained case.
Proposition 2 In the unconstrained case in equilibrium we have 8i = 1; 2; i 6 = j
In order to have a benchmark for what would happen in a world without distributional con ‡ict, consider the case where e i and e j are constrained to be zero. Then the resulting game is equivalent to a two player voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) to a public good with the marginal private return (MPR) of =2: There socially bene…cial investment is an equilibrium if 2: Therefore, for 2 (2; 4) the anticipated distributional …ght in theory prevents cooperation that would appear if the distribution of the proceeds were enforced without con ‡ict by a third party or by strong property rights. We have a hold-up problem.
A vast amount of experimental studies have shown that humans to a certain extend cooperate even if the MPR is below unity as long as the marginal social return is greater than one. 6 Such a situation occurs in our case if 2 (1; 2) and if e¤orts are restricted to zero. There is an interesting empirical questions arising from the comparison of our strategic game to the standard VCM game. How strong do incentives have to be to induce cooperation in our model, where the proceeds from cooperation have to be fought for? Do subjects cooperate when 2 (1; 2), as they do in the normal VCM game with the equivalent marginal private return? Do subjects cooperate in the case where in the VCM with an equivalent MPR full cooperation is an equilibrium, while it is not in our game (i.e. for 2 [2; 4))?
In the standard VCM with an e¢ ciency factor that creates a social dilemma, subjects' contributions are bene…cial for social welfare. This is not necessarily the case in an environment where the proceeds from cooperation will be fought over. Observe that an increase in the contribution increases the prize for the following contest and therefore the incentive to expend resources in the …ght for a share of the prize. Suppose that subjects play the contest stage according to SPNE and foresee this. The question is now under which parameter settings the remaining reduced game is still a social dilemma, in which cooperation is socially bene…cial but not individually rational.
Remark 2 If we assume that players exert equilibrium e¤ orts e i = e j = (c i + c j )=4; then the reduced game is a social dilemma whenever 2 (2; 4):
To see this, take the individual payo¤ from (1) and the joint payo¤ from (2) and substitute in the optimal e¤ort to obtain
The arising reduced game is a social dilemma if
which is the case if 2 (2; 4):
Equilibrium in the constrained case
If a player has to …nance his investment and …ghting e¤ort from the same budget C; then we are in case b) from De…nition 1. Solving backwards, it becomes clear that for low initial investments the constraint does not come into play and the subgame-perfect continuation follows equation (3). This is the case for player i whenever
Note that the critical player is the player who has a lower budget left after investing. If the player who invested more in the …rst stage has still enough funds to exert e¤ort e then the other player has also enough funds left. Taking this into account and solving the inequality above results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The subgame-perfect continuation e¤ orts are
In a next step we establish that a player, who is constrained, prefers the maximum e¤ort possible to any other lower e¤ort given the e¤ort of the opponent. Observe that the marginal bene…t of increasing the e¤ort is positive for all e¤orts below the best-response e¤ort as i 0 s objective function is concave in e i . 7 It follows that the best response to an e¤ort that leaves a player constrained is the maximum e¤ort available:
Further observe that only the increasing part of the best-response correspondence comes into play, as the unconstrained best-response correspondence increases up to the unconstrained equilibrium continuation at V =4 and greater e¤orts are strictly dominated. Existence of the subgame-perfect continuation is not a problem, since best-responses are continuous on the relevant compact domain [0; V =4]:
We can now establish that the player with less resources left in a subgame-perfect continuation will always fully exhaust the remaining resources if the constraint is binding, while the player with more resources best-responds to this. 8
Lemma 2 If c i c j and
then in the subgame-perfect continuation we have
Proof. See appendix.
In a next step we show that we can rule out the existence of asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria.
Lemma 3 For 6 = 4 no SPNE exists where c i 6 = c j :
The Lemma above guarantees that we can concentrate on symmetric equilibria. We will have two di¤erent equilibria: one that corresponds to the non-cooperation equilibrium found in the unconstrained case for < 4 and an equilibrium, where players divide their investment evenly across cooperation and …ghting. Proposition 3 For < 4 an equilibrium that produces the outcome c i = c j = e i = e j = 0 exists:
We now turn to the case where players invest positive amounts. A …rst conjecture could be that there exist some equilibria with positive investment for > 4. While this conjecture is correct, the condition > 4 is not necessary.
Proposition 4 There exists an equilibrium with the outcome c i = c j = e i = e j = C=2 if 8=3:
Proof. See appendix. There also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium for e¢ ciency factors under which we have both pure-strategy equilibria. In this mixed strategy equilibrium players randomize between choosing c i = 0 and c i = C=2: For a player to be indi¤erent between the two strategies we require a speci…c probability j with which the other player chooses C=2.
Proposition 5 For 2 (8=3; 4) there exists a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium where each player chooses c i = C=2 with probability = 4 2 ( 2)
and zero with probability 1 :
Proof. We require player j to make player i indi¤erent:
Symmetry ensures i = j : Social e¢ ciency in the mixed-strategy equilibrium increases with , since investments are socially bene…cial. 9 Expected social welfare in the Nash Equilibrium computes to
Somewhat counter-intuitively social welfare in this equilibrium is monotonously decreasing in the e¢ ciency of investment :
Welfare predictions
Comparing predicted social welfare across the two di¤erent situations (constrained and unconstrained), shows that there exists an interval of the investment e¢ ciency, where equilibrium welfare can be higher in the constrained case. For 2 (8=3; 4) in the unconstrained case only a zero contribution equilibrium exists, while in the constrained case also equilibria exist, where players contribute half their endowment with positive probability. The expected welfare in these equilibria is greater than in the zero-contribution equilibrium. For all other parameter values of the predicted welfare is the same in both conditions. Figure 1 plots the ratio of expected welfare to the value of the endowments. Values of above one represent gains from cooperation. The solid line represents equilibria that yield the same welfare in the constrained and unconstrained case. The dashed lines represent the higher welfare in the constrained case from the pure-strategy equilibrium (the straight increasing line) and from the mixed-strategy equilibrium (the convex and decreasing line). From public-goods experiments we know that humans regularly cooperate to a certain extent in social dilemma situations despite of the dominant strategy not to do so. In what follows we engage in a thought experiment. Assume that subjects expect and execute equilibrium play in the contest phase. Under this assumption we can check if then the contribution stage still constitutes a social dilemma. Clearly, for the constrained case with 2 (8=3; 4) this is not the case, since there are two equilibria with positive contributions. The game has become a coordination game. 10 For the unconstrained case things are straight-forward and we have established in Proposition 1 that the reduced game is a social dilemma for 2 (2; 4). This implies that contributing if < 2 is only welfare enhancing if in the second stage subjects can manage to reduce e¤orts below the equilibrium level. Otherwise, the increase in the value of the joint project due to an increased contribution is overcompensated by the wasted e¤ort in the distributional contest induced by the increase in the value. In contrast, in the case of 2 (2; 4) an increased contribution leads to a larger increase in the value of the joint project than in the resources wasted in the contest. Therefore, contributions in this case over-all improve welfare, even if in the contest stage optimal e¤orts are chosen. Note that a rational and purely sel…sh player still does not have an incentive to contribute, as the expected private return of the contribution is negative.
Experimental design
Given the theoretical treatment above, four sub-cases are of major interest.
First we want to test if there is a tendency for subjects to invest in the project in a case where it could damage over-all welfare. For this reason we require a treatment with < 2; where in the unconstrained case optimal e¤orts wipe out more welfare than the contributions create. We choose a factor of = 1:6: 11 We complement the treatment with unconstrained e¤orts by one where both contributions and e¤orts have to be …nanced by the same endowment. This will help answering the question if constraints on the war chest mitigate the problem of welfare damaging contributions. These treatments with low e¢ ciency factors will be referred to as unconstrained_low and constrained_low.
Our second case of interest is that of a high social return to contributions. There, in the unconstrained case higher contributions are social-welfare enhancing, but not individually rational (for < 4). Theoretically, in the constrained case with the same e¢ ciency factor (for 2 (8=3; 4)) welfare should be weakly higher, as beyond the no-contribution equilibrium two others featuring positive contributions exist. If we take into account that subjects might be able to overcome the social dilemma in the unconstrained case, then the expected welfare ranking could be reversed, as subjects do not have to keep resources for …ghting in reserve. We run two treatments with an e¢ ciency factor of = 3 and denote them by unconstrained_high and constrained_high. Table 1 summarises the treatments and reports the equilibrium predictions. Note that we have multiple equilibria in the con-strained_high treatment. So we report the two di¤erent contribution and the three di¤erent e¤ort levels that might be observed in equilibrium.
In all four treatments we set the endowment to C = 20: Subjects played 20 of the two-stage games each. The treatments were computerised and (Fischbacher, 2007) .
For each treatment we ran …ve sessions with between 18 and 24. We employed a stranger design, i.e. after each period new groups of two were randomly determined. In two sessions per treatment the matching pool consisted of all subjects in the session. In the remaining three sessions we formed subgroups of six subjects that were randomly re-matched to each other. With the creation of the smaller matching groups we are able to obtain a reasonable number of independent observations. 12 Over all, 512 subjects participated in our experiments. 13 Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2003) . The participants were mainly students (undergraduate and postgraduate) of the University of Adelaide and other South Australian universities. Experimental earnings were exchanged for Australian Dollars at the end of the session. On average, subjects earned a bit more than 20 Australian Dollars (slightly below $20 US at the time of the experiments). The experiment, including the reading of the instructions and payment, took about one hour.
Results
In what follows we will present our main results. First, we look for treatment e¤ects with respect to social welfare. Then we will dig deeper and identify the underlying drivers of these treatment e¤ects.
Social Welfare
In our setting the average social welfare in a treatment is given by the average pro…t subjects earn in this treatment. Standard theory predicts that we will observe the same welfare in three of the treatments (unconstrained_high, unconstrained_low and constrained_low) . In all of these the unique equilibrium entails zero contributions and zero e¤orts with the consequence that all subjects make a pro…t of 20 Experimental Currency Units per period (i.e. they keep their endowment). In the remaining treatment (constrained_high) besides the zero-contribution equilibrium there exist two other, more e¢ cient equilibria. In the most e¢ cient equilibrium subjects evenly split their endowment on contributions and e¤orts, which would result in a pro…t of 30 ECU. In the remaining mixed strategy equilibrium on average the payo¤ is equal to 22:5 ECU (the group welfare from Equation (6) Figure 2 plots the average pro…t for the di¤erent treatments across rounds and demonstrates a strong treatment e¤ect. Individual average profits are greater in the high than in the low e¢ ciency treatments (p < 0:01 for all pair-wise treatment comparisons, M-W tests on payo¤s averaged over all rounds and subjects within a matching group). Within an e¢ ciency level, subjects being constrained has di¤erential e¤ects on individual payo¤s. Constraint subjects have lower pro…ts compared to the unconstrained ones if the e¢ ciency factor is high (p < 0:06; M-W test, two-sided). This clearly contradicts the theoretical predictions, as only in the constrained case equilibria exist with positive welfare improving investments. If the e¢ ciency factor is low, then the constraint on e¤orts tends to improve pro…ts (p < 0:055;M-W test, two-sided), while theory would predict no di¤erence. 14 Next we compare the average pro…t made in the treatments to the predicted pro…ts. Table 2 shows the results from one-sided median tests on the basis of pro…ts averaged across all individuals within an independent observation and all periods. 15 We see that subjects in the unconstrained_low treatment made less pro…t then they would have made if they had not cooperated at all as prescribed by equilibrium. The same is true for the con-strained_low treatment. This di¤erence is signi…cant due to the very small variation across independent observations (the 13 independent observations all lie between 18.5 and 20.2). The quantitative deviation from equilibrium pro…ts is small though. In the unconstrained_high treatment, where conditional on subgame-perfect e¤orts contributing improves surpluses, subjects did signi…cantly better than in the unique non-cooperation equilibrium. Subjects were able to overcome the hold-up problem to some extent. In the constrained_high treatment, the pro…ts sit somewhere between the prediction for the best equilibrium, where the endowment is equally shared between cooperative investment and …ghting, and the mixed-strategy equilibrium. These results remain unaltered if we either consider only the last ten or just the last period. This shows that our …ndings are not driven by early rounds, where subjects might still exhibit a considerable amount of confusion.
1 4 Considering that we only have 13 to 14 independent observations per treatment the results are surprisingly strong. A random-e¤ect panel that exploits all individual variation, allows for clustering on the level of an independent observation and controls for period e¤ects and demographics con…rms the results. unc_high pro…t = 20 30:25 p < 0:01 more e¢ cient than predicted pro…t = 20 p < 0:01 more e¢ cient than in worst equilibrium con_high pro…t = 22:5 27:77 p < 0:01 more e¢ cient than in mixed equilibrium pro…t = 30 p < 0:01 less e¢ cient than in best equilibrium 
Contributions and e¤orts
There are two elements that drive social welfare: contributions have a positive e¤ect and e¤orts impact negatively. This is the case in all treatments. While the contributions' marginal welfare improvement is greater in the treatments with a high e¢ ciency factor, the cost of e¤ort is the same in all treatments. However, a higher value of the group project, that is caused ceteris paribus by a greater e¢ ciency factor, also strengthens the incentive to exert wasteful e¤ort. So apparently, in the light of observed play being o¤equilibrium, it is not clear a priori whether the e¢ ciency di¤erences across treatments and the deviations from the theoretical predictions are driven by contributions or e¤orts or a combination of both. Figure 3 shows the decomposition of the net surplus over time in the low e¢ ciency treatments. The circles represent the average surplus that was created from contributions. Here we consider only the net surplus creation, which means that we deduct the opportunity cost of investing. In the low e¢ ciency treatments each unit of contribution creates 0:6 units of net surplus (i.e. 1). The triangles depict the average surplus wasted in the distributive contest, which is equal to average e¤ort as e¤ort causes a unit cost. The di¤erence between the circles and triangles is the average welfare change caused by subjects engaging in investment and distributional contest. In the case where the triangles are above the circles the di¤erence represents a welfare loss. When the circles are above the triangles, then we have a welfare gain compared to a subject neither investing nor …ghting. We see that in both treatments the surplus creation from investment is quite similar. In both treatments the surplus created starts at a similar level and declines with time. The di¤erence in e¢ ciency in the two treatments (as established above) comes from the di¤erence in resources wasted in the con- test. As one might expect, the amount of resources wasted is greater in the case where there are no constraints. The welfare losses in earlier periods in the unconstrained case are driven by the high e¤orts over-compensating for the surpluses. The gap between surpluses and e¤orts narrows over time, as e¤orts decline more strongly than surpluses. In the constrained case average surpluses are very similar to those in the unconstrained case. The slightly lower e¤orts are the driving force behind the slightly higher e¢ ciency in early periods. In the high-e¢ ciency treatments depicted in Figure 4 .2, we observe much higher surpluses created. This is caused by both higher investments and by higher net surplus per unit of investment (i.e. 1 = 2). Also, the surpluses (i.e. the contributions) do not decline sharply over time, as in the low e¢ciency case. Remarkably, the surpluses are very large in the unconstrained case, where standard theory would have predicted zero surpluses. In the constrained treatment, where equilibria with positive contributions exist, surpluses are lower though. E¤orts follow the surpluses. Subjects use more resources in the unconstrained case, where surpluses are higher. Over-all the e¤ect of very high surpluses in the unconstrained treatment dominates the e¤ort e¤ect. Therefore welfare is higher in the unconstrained case. Surplus in the high-efficiency treatments
A closer look at contributions
Looking at the contributions we see a few interesting patterns. In both conditions (i.e. constrained and unconstrained) the contributions in the treatments with a high e¢ ciency factor on average tend to be greater than in the corresponding treatment with a low e¢ ciency factor. In addition, the treatments with the low e¢ ciency factor show a downward trend, which is reminiscent to the decay of cooperation in public goods games without distributional contests. In contrast, a high e¢ ciency factor leads to stable investments. Moreover, subjects seem to be careful not to exhaust their budget through contributions and to become defenseless in the constraint treatments. This leads to contributions being higher in the unconstrained treatments when compared to the constrained case with the same e¢ ciency factor. We also ran a random-e¤ects regression with error clustering on independent observations reported in Table 3 in the Appendix, which con…rms the intuition gained from the visual inspection of average contributions.
A closer look at e¤orts
A closer look reveals that on average subjects'e¤orts are remarkably close to the subgame-perfect continuation e¤orts. For given contribution levels subjects chose on average e¤orts that are close to Nash. Figure 1 plots actual e¤orts against the predicted subgame-perfect e¤orts for the unconstrained treatments. We also depict a linear prediction (the dashed line). Observe that in both treatments the linear prediction is very close to the 45-degree line, which indicates that on average e¤orts were close to the Nash prediction. In the low-e¢ ciency treatment the slope of the linear prediction is very close to one (0.93 with a standard error of 0.01), while it is slightly lower in the high-e¢ ciency treatment (0.85 also with a standard error of 0.01). So on average subjects exert e¤orts close to those that are subgame perfect. Recall that the subgame-perfect continuation e¤ort is exactly a quarter of the project value. In a somewhat crude statistical test based on the independent observations we take the average ratio of e¤ort to the value of the project across all periods and subjects that form an independent observation and compare these ratios to the equilibrium ratio of 0.25 using a median test. In the low e¢ ciency treatment there is no statistically signi…cant di¤erence (p > 0:99; two-sided), while there is a di¤erence for the high e¢ ciency treatment (p < 0:02; two-sided).
We obtain the same result if we use a more sophisticated econometric model. We ran a multilevel panel regression model were we regressed e¤ort on an interaction between the value of the group project and the treatment. In addition we took into account that there might be unobserved Err. = 0:009) in the high-e¢ ciency treatment. Only the fraction for the high-e¢ ciency treatment was signi…cantly di¤erent (i.e. lower) than the predicted quarter (p < 0:01): Table 5 shows the distribution of individual slopes we estimated. While it is clustered around the optimal value (i.e. 0:25) for the low e¢ ciency treatment, the individual ratios are slightly lower in the high e¢ ciency treatment.
In the light of the result that we do not have over-dissipation without constraints on e¤orts, one might expect to observe strong under-dissipation in the case of constrained e¤orts. This is not the case. On average, e¤orts are even closer to optimal e¤orts in the constrained treatments than in the unconstrained. In Figure 6 we again provide a scatterplot where we plot actual against Nash e¤orts. In the case of constrained e¤orts we distinguish between observations, where subjects exhausted their remaining budget for e¤ort (light grey circles) and where they did not (dark grey circles). Again, we also plot the linear prediction, which here in both cases almost coincides with the 45-degree line. This indicates that the average actual e¤ort 
Why is there no signi…cant over-exertion of e¤orts?
The observation that subjects'e¤orts are close to the equilibrium, if not a bit lower, are quite surprising, since most experimental studies with contests report over-exertion of e¤orts (for recent surveys see Sheremeta, 2013; Dechenaux et al., 2014) . While many factors have been shown to in ‡uence the degree of over-dissipation, its existence has proven very robust. For example, groups over-dissipate more than individuals, and over-dissipation is stronger with within-group punishment opportunities (Abbink et al., 2010) . The interaction of the feedback subjects receive and the nature of the contest function (sharing versus stochastic winner-takes-it-all) has a strong impact Figure 6 : Actual vs. Nash e¤orts in the constrained treatments on e¤orts. Only in the share contest without information on the opponents actions and payo¤s over-dissipation disappears in latter rounds (Fallucchi et al., 2013) . Sharing contests -as in our case -yield e¤orts closer to Nash equilibrium than lottery contest if cost are convex (Chowdhury et al., 2014) . Smaller endowments are an other way to reduce over-exertion (Price and Sheremeta, 2011) . Over-exertion also exists in multi-stage (Sheremeta, 2010) and asymmetric (Fonseca, 2009) contest. Allowing subjects to form alliances does not prevent excessive e¤orts (Ke et al., 2013) . Moreover, breaking up one grand contest into smaller sub-contests (Sheremeta, 2011) or rationing the available e¤ective e¤ort (Faravelli and Stanca, 2012) does not solve the problem. Neither does combing the contest with another decision (Bayer and Sutter, 2009 ). In our treatments with constrained e¤ort subjects cannot over-exert efforts, whenever the e¤ort constraint is binding. In these situations any mistakes made by subjects necessarily are those of under-exerting. Together with over-exertion in situations where the constraints do not bind, this plausibly explains near Nash play on average. The …nding that there is no over-exertion on average in the unconstrained treatments is more interesting, though. In what follows, we explore potential causes speci…c to our design. One likely major cause is that we use a share contest, which eliminates extra utility of winning or risk preferences as drivers of excessive e¤orts. Since this is well documented (Shupp et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2014) , we explore other possible causes. We have three potential in ‡uence factors in mind. Firstly, suppose that subjects are reciprocal beings. Then observing their partners making positive contributions could induce reduced e¤orts as a consequence of reciprocating to kindness. Secondly, the fact that subjects play a contribution stage before the contest might put subjects in a cooperative frame of mind, which leads to less aggressive behavior in the contests. 17 Thirdly, one di¤erence to other studies on contests is that we provide our subjects with a pro…t calculator that calculates their share of the prize, cost and their net pro…t for any combination of own and partner e¤orts they enter. 18 If bounded rationality is a major driver of over-exertion of e¤ort then the calculator should clearly reduce e¤orts. 19 Reciprocity as a major reason for lower than expected e¤orts can be excluded by looking more closely at the data. We use a random-coe¢ cient model (reported in Table 4 in the Appendix) with error clustering on independent observations to estimate the determinants of the slope of the e¤ort-prize relation. Somebody who is playing according to equilibrium should have a slope coe¢ cient of 0.25 which should be invariant to all other variables. If subjects are reciprocal though, then the e¤ort as a fraction of the prize should decrease if the partner was generous in the contribution stage. We use the di¤erence in the contributions as a fraction of total contributions as a measure. This measure takes on the values one if only the other player contributed, zero if both contributed the same amount and minus one if only the person in question contributed. The coe¢ cient on this measure capturing reciprocity is very small and not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. 20 In order to assess if the existence of the contribution stage puts subjects in a more cooperative mind and leads to lower e¤orts, we ran an additional treatment where the subjects (n = 30, recruited from the same population) played only the contest stage. In order to make the contest comparable 1 7 Savikhin and Sheremeta (2013) found such spillovers when a cooperative and a competitive game were played simultaneously. 1 8 Mago et al. (2013) is to our knowledge the only other study that used some kind of a calculator in experimental contests. There the calculator was not a pro…t calculator but just a calculator for the winning probability though.
1 9 Lim et al. (2014) and Sheremeta (2011) show that models of bounded rationality such as Quantal Response Equilibrium or Cognitive Hierarchy predict over-exertion.
2 0 For robustness we tried di¤erent measures such as dummies for having contributed more or less than the other but never obtained a signi…cant coe¢ cient. across treatments we matched every subject in this new treatment with one from the high_unconstrained treatment. We then let the new subject play exactly the same contests their match from the original treatment had played (with the identical prize and residual endowments). So these players played exactly the same contests an other subject had played before without ever hearing about the existence of a contribution stage. The results show that the hypothesis of a contribution stage putting subjects in a more cooperative mindset cannot be supported. The coe¢ cients estimating the e¤ort-value ratio in the aforementioned random-coe¢ cient model are not signi…cantly di¤erent across the original and the treatment without a cooperation stage. Moreover, the distributions of estimated individual slopes are not signi…cantly di¤erent (KS test, p > 0:62) . Furthermore, the mean slopes estimated for the two di¤erent treatments are extremely close (i.e. 0.219 vs. 0.216).
Finally, we ran a treatment (two sessions with 38 subjects from the same population) that was identical to the high-unconstrained treatment but with the pro…t calculator removed. With this we can test the third hypothesis which attributes overly high e¤orts to bounded rationality. We …nd that subjects indeed expend higher e¤orts for given prizes if the pro…t calculator is removed. The estimated parameter for the share of the prize invested as e¤ort is signi…cantly higher without the pro…t calculator than in the high_unconstrained treatment (p < 0:05). Also the average predicted individual fraction of the prize invested as e¤ort (i.e. the mean slope mentioned above) is clearly higher without a pro…t calculator (i.e. 0.262 vs. 0.219) and a KS-test rejects the null hypothesis of identically distributed individual slopes (p < 0:001). This shows that the pro…t calculator as expected reduces e¤orts signi…cantly. However, the e¤ect is quite modest and without the calculator we still do not observe excessive e¤orts to the extent reported in many other studies.
In summary, the lack of over-exertion of e¤orts is not caused by the combination of cooperative and competitive stages. Our pro…t calculator has been identi…ed to cause lower e¤orts. The e¤ect is not su¢ ciently large to explain the di¤erence to other contest experiments. We conjecture that the main factor driving the comparatively low e¤orts has been the use of a share contest instead of a lottery contest.
Conclusion
This paper develops a simple model of cooperation and distributive con ‡ict and tests its predictions in the laboratory. The observed willingness of (at least some) humans to cooperate, which contradicts standard theoretical predictions, has interesting consequences in our environment. While cooperation increases social welfare in pure social dilemmas, we observe that for a low social return it is welfare damaging if a distributive contests follows. Subjects only learn over time that they are better o¤ by not cooperating. In situations, where the social return of cooperation is high, unpredicted but observed cooperation improves welfare considerably. In both cases, with high and low social returns, the welfare e¤ect is dampened, when cooperative investment and e¤ort in the distributive contest have to come from the same budget. The resulting reduction in e¤orts in the distributional contest prevents an over-all damage of welfare in the case of low returns to cooperation. In the high return case we observe lower levels of cooperation, which leads to lower welfare gains than when e¤orts are unconstrained. This is in clear contrast to the theoretical prediction that welfare is expected to be weakly higher in the constraint case. This can be explained as follows. The constraint allows agents in theory to overcome part of the holdup-problem, as contributions reduce the amount of e¤orts left for …ghting and therefore make contributing worthwhile. At the same time contributions cannot be too high as then agents would become defenseless in the contest. In the unconstrained case players are predicted by theory not to overcome their hold-up problem at all. In the experiments they do overcome the hold-up problem though. Contributions are even higher, because there is no need for keeping some of the endowment for the distributive contest.
A.2 Lemma 3
Proof. First observe, that for
we have @ @c i EU i (c i ; c j ; e i ; e j ) = @ @c j EU j (c j ; c i ; e j ; e i ) = 4 1:
which implies that for < 4 only c i = c j = 0 and for > 4 c i = c j = 2C=(2 + ) are equilibrium candidates. So in the unconstrained region all equilibria have to be symmetric. Next consider the situation, where one player is constrained, while the other is not. Without loss of generality assume c i > c j : Then we can write the pro…t of the constrained player i as
Substituting e j as calculated in (5) The marginal expected payo¤ change @EU i (c i ; c j ; e i ; e j )=@c i has the same sign as C 2c i c j ;
which implies that the only equilibrium candidate is given by
The payo¤ of the unconstrained player j is given by
which has a unique critical point at
Since Equations (7) and (8) are not consistent with each other we can rule out an asymmetric equilibrium with one constrained player.
It remains to be checked if an asymmetric equilibrium with two constrained players is possible. The payo¤ of a constrained player (conditional on the other player also being constrained) is given by
The …rst-order condition for a best response conditional on both players being constrained yields:
Checking the curvature shows that for a potential local maximum (for a choice of c i ) we require:
which is satis…ed for interior c i and c j :
Taking (9) and subtracting the corresponding …rst-order condition for player j yields p
which concludes the proof.
A.3 Proposition 3
Proof. We can write the pro…t of player i depending on c i for player j choosing c j = 0 and both players following the subgame perfect continuation after investments as,
First observe that the payo¤ is continuous at c i = 4C 4+ : Then since the payo¤ is decreasing for c i < 4C 4+ and < 4, we have
and that
which implies that there is no pro…table deviation from c i = 0 if c j = 0:
A.4 Proposition 4
Proof. In any symmetric equilibrium either both players are constrained or they are both unconstrained. Taking the …rst-order condition for the constrained case from (9) and setting c j = c i in order to restrict attention to symmetric equilibria yields c i = c j = C=2:
So the only candidate for a constrained equilibrium outcome is c i = c j = e i = e j = C=2 with individuals payo¤s being EU i (c i ; c j ; e i ; e j ) = C 2 :
Now suppose that player j chooses c j = C=2 and e j (c i ; C=2):Then depending on the choice of i three di¤erent continuations are possible. First, both players remain constrained and reply with e i = C c i , e j = C c j : A deviation to an investment that does not remove the constraint for the second stage is never pro…table. This follows form the …rst and second-order condition in the proof for Lemma (3). Second i reduces c i such that he becomes unconstrained, while j remains constrained. This is the case for
The continuation is e i (c i ; C=2) = p C=2(C=2 + c i ) C=2 and e j (C=2; c i ) = C=2;which yields the payo¤
Deviating marginally upwards from a given c i yields the change in pro…t of @ @c i EU i (c i ; C=2; e i ; e j ) = 1 r C C + 2c i :
Note that the change increases in c i , which allows us to bound this change in pro…t from below by setting c i = 0. The lower bound then becomes
Therefore (and since the payo¤ is continuous at c i = C(8 ) 2(4+ ) ) a deviation from c i = C=2 towards a lower investment that removes the own constraint only is not pro…table. The third range of c i that leads to a particular continuation is
where the constraints of both players are relaxed. The payo¤ of i is given by EU i (c i ; C=2; e i ; e j ) = C + (c i + C=2) 4 c i which is increasing for 4; which implies (as EU i is continuous at c = C (4 ) =2 ;) that for 4 the claimed equilibrium exists. For < 4 the maximum payo¤ conditional on c i removing the constraints for both plays is at c i = 0, which requires EU i (C=2; C=2; e i ; e j ) EU i (0; C=2; e i ; e j ) 0 or
for the claimed equilibrium to exist. Welcome to the experiment! Before we start, please read the instructions carefully.
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points rather than Dollars. Points are converted to Dollars at the following exchange rate at the end of the session to determine your payment: 70 P oints = AU D 1:00
You will be paid in cash immediately after the experiment. You are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will attend to you individually. Failure to comply with the outlined rules will result in exclusion from the experiment and you will forfeit your payment.
Summary
After being grouped with a person who is randomly chosen by a computer, you will play a two-stage game described in the experiment section below. The game consists of two recurring stages. Both players'task is to decide how much to invest in a group project in the …rst stage. Once the project is completed both players' task, in the second stage, is to choose how much e¤ort they would like to invest in an attempt to acquire a share of the group investment. How much e¤ort each player puts in determines how the proceeds get split between both players.
The experiment
In what follows we will refer to the person you are playing with as your 'group member'. Both of you will be making investment and e¤ort decisions as follows
Investment stage
On the following page is a screen shot to familiarize you with how the investment stage will appear on your screen Your task is to divide your endowment (20 points) between what you keep for yourself and what you invest in a group project. The other group member has to do the same by choosing their investment at the same time as you.
The value of the group project depends on your investment and the investment of the other group member.
Once your investment has been made, you will be noti…ed how much you and the other group member have individually invested in the project. The sum of your investments will be multiplied by 3 and that will be the total value of the project for that round. This means that in every round:
Value of the project = 3 x (your investment + other group member's investment)
This concludes Stage A.
Distribution stage:
The following is a screen shot to familiarize you with what the distribution or e¤ort stage will look like on your screen:
In this stage of the experiment, your task is to determine an amount of e¤ort that you would like to invest in order to acquire a share of the group project. Your group member has to do the same.
The more e¤ort you put in for a given level of the other group member's e¤ort, the larger will be your share of the project, however, the higher will be your e¤ort cost. On the other hand, the smaller your investment of e¤ort is for the given e¤ort of your group member, the smaller will be your share of the project, however, the e¤ort cost you incur will also be low. The same is true for the other group member.
As a guide, on the back of these instructions is a table attached which represents values of percentage share of the project that you can expect to get for any given values of your own and your group member's e¤ort.
In addition, you will be provided with a pro…t calculator on your screen (as visible in the screen shot above) which you can use to calculate what your expected pro…t will be for any combination of your own and the other group member's e¤ort input.
Please note that the pro…t calculator is there only for your help. It does not a¤ect your …nal pro…t in any way. You can play around with it using di¤erent values of e¤ort for yourself and the other group member. You can
